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sing accounting quality as an indicator of the focus of accounting on capital providers' needs, we
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se of local standards in the preparation of legal entity financial statements exhibit a significantly
ower level of accounting quality, both prior to and after IFRS adoption. We interpret these results as
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he implementation of IFRS, results suggest that firms in these countries face a lower demand for
igh quality financial reporting.
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1. IntroductionDiversity in accounting practices has been shown to deter cross-country investment
decisions due to the increase in information asymmetries and information costs it entails
(e.g., Ahearne, Griever, & Warnock, 2004). Accordingly, harmonization of accounting
practices is assumed to reduce barriers to cross-country investments (e.g., Bradshaw,
Bushee, & Miller, 2004). Convergence of accounting standards is expected to improve
confidence in publicly traded companies, fostering the development of capital markets and
thereby promoting economic growth (Hope, Justin, & Kang, 2006). With this aim, in the
last decade of the 20th century, the European Union (EU, hereafter) established a new
strategy regarding accounting harmonization that crystallized in the requirement of
European-listed companies to prepare, since 2005, their consolidated accounts in
accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)1 (Regulation EC
1606/2002).
The mandatory adoption of IFRS in the EU represents one of the largest regulatory
experiments ever undertaken (Christensen, Lee, & Walker, 2007). It is based on the
assumption that accounting harmonization is a necessary requirement for the globalization of
capital markets, as it improves comparability of financial statements.2 This new regulation has
affected approximately 7000 EU-listed companies (CESR, 2007). Regarding legal entity
financial statements, however, Regulation EC 1606/2002 allows European Member States to
either allow or require companies to follow domestic standards. This is particularly striking, as
the European Commission expressed in 1995 (COM 95 (508): 4) that:
“3.3. [T]he most urgent problem is that concerning European companies with an
international vocation. The accounts prepared by those companies in accordanceIn
that th
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measurwith their national legislation, based on the Accounting Directives, are no longer
acceptable for international capital market purposes. These companies are therefore
obliged to prepare two sets of accounts, one set which is in conformity with the
Accounting Directives and another set which is required by the international capital
markets. This situation is not satisfactory. It is costly and the provision of different
figures in different environments is confusing to investors and to the public at large.”
addition to the problems of cost and confusion, the Commission also acknowledged
e coexistence of different reporting frameworks deters effective supervision andenforcement of financial reporting requirements of publicly traded companies. This, in turn,
harms investors' confidence in listed firms, thus hampering cross-border trade and putting
EU securities markets globally at a severe competitive disadvantage.
1 For purposes of simplicity, we use the term IFRS to refer both to the IFRS issued by the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the International Accounting Standards (IAS) issued by its predecessor,rnational Accounting Standards Committee (IASC).
th, Landsman, Lang, and Williams (2009) document an increase in comparability between U.S.-GAAP-
nd IFRS-based accounting amounts following IFRS adoption, especially after 2005. The importance of
ization for international valuation and allocation of resources is highlighted in the study by Gómez-
i and López-Espinosa (2008). They show that, at the international level, the Fama and French (1993) three-
model performs significantly better when using homogeneous information (i.e., IFRS accounting
es).
2
In spite of the views expressed by the European Commission, about half of the Member
States forming the EU at the time Regulation EC 1606/2002 was passed opted for requiring
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Table 1
Sample companies.
Country Number of companies % over total sample IFRS permitted in all company statements
Denmark 47 4.52 Yes a
Finland 63 6.06 Yes
Greece 52 5.01 Yes
Ireland 0 0 Yes
Luxembourg 3 0.29 Yes
Netherlands 59 5.68 Yes
Norway 56 5.39 Yes
United Kingdom 86 8.28 Yes
Austria 7 0.67 No b
Belgium 28 2.7 No
France 222 21.36 No
Germany 88 8.47 No †
Italy 142 13.67 No
Portugal 12 1.16 No
Spain 70 6.74 No
Sweden 104 10.01 No
Total 1039 100
a Yes indicates that firms in this country are allowed to use IFRS in all company statements. These countries are
named full adopters in the present study.
b No indicates that firms are required to apply local standards in legal entity financial statements. These countries
are named partial adopters in the present study.
† Although Germany permits the use of IFRS in legal entity financial statements, statutory accounts that conform
to national GAAP are also required. This is why this country is classified as a partial adopter country.he application of local standards in the preparation of legal entity statements3 (see Table 1).
n this study, we name them partial adopters, since two accounting systems still coexist in
hese countries: consolidated financial statements are prepared in accordance with IFRS,
hile legal entity financial statements follow domestic standards.4 The rest of countries
full adopters, hereafter) permit the use of IFRS in all company statements.
This study investigates whether the decision to retain local standards for legal entity
inancial statements in EUMember States is associated with differences in the roles played by
ccounting information and, as a consequence, with dissimilarities in the demand for high-
uality financial reporting across European countries. We argue that countries in which the
3 In some cases, decisions adopted by Member States regarding individual financial statements vary depending
n the type of companies. As an example, Italy permits the use of IFRS in legal entity financial statements, except
or insurance companies, small firms, and certain regulated companies. The reader can refer to ICAEW (2007) for
detailed description of the option selected by each country for each type of companies. In this study, we name
ull adopters those countries that permit all firms to use IFRS both in legal entity and consolidated financial
tatements. The rest of the countries (e.g., Italy) are named partial adopters, since these countries require that all
ompanies, or at least certain types, apply local standards in the preparation of legal entity financial statements.
4 According to the survey by Jermakowicz and Gornik-Tomaszewski (2006), European companies perceive that
he expected benefits of IFRS adoption may not occur if subsidiaries are required to apply local GAAP in
reparing their individual financial statements.
3
preservation of the regulatory function traditionally played by accounting is important have
retained local standards for legal entities because IFRS, due to its focus on the information
needs of capital providers (Whittington, 2005), will not fulfill this requirement.5
As an indicator of the orientation of the accounting system toward the needs of capital
providers, we use accounting quality, measured in this study as the explanatory power of
accounting measures for stock prices and one-year-ahead operating cash flows.6 Both
measures of accounting quality reflect the usefulness of accounting information for investors
and creditors. Hence, we assume that higher levels of accounting quality are indicative of the
orientation of accounting toward the satisfaction of capital providers' needs, whereas lower
levels of financial reporting quality indicate that accounting is fulfilling other roles.
To carry out our analyses, we exploit the advantage of the information prepared for the
first-adoption of IFRS in Europe. European-listed companies starting to apply IFRS in 2005
were required to restate their prior-year (2004) financial statements to IFRS. As a result, two
sets of financial statements are available for 2004: (1) those prepared in accordance with
local accounting standards and included in the 2004 annual report and (2) those restated to
IFRS and released jointly with the 2005 financial statements. This allows us to compare
accounting numbers prepared under IFRS and domestic standards for the same set of
companies and the same year. This approach ensures that differences observed between
financial measures are exclusively due to differences in accounting standards, since
everything else is held constant. It also eliminates the problem of controlling for the change
in the firms' incentives to improve financial reporting faced by researchers in previous
studies (e.g., Barth, Landsman, & Lang, 2008). In our design, identical economic reality is
recorded by firms using two different sets of accounting standards. Moreover, the fact that
our analyses refer to the same time period (2004) ensures that differences observed in the
explanatory power of accounting measures are not due to changes in the economic
environment. Hence, firm, country, or even economic factors that might affect corporate
accounting quality are held constant in our study.
Using a sample of European non-financial companies we show that, before the application
of IFRS, our measures of accounting quality (i.e., the explanatory power of earnings and
equity book value for stock prices and the ability of earnings to explain future cash flows) are
significantly higher for firms in the group of full adopters. These results are consistent with the
argument that companies in these countries face a stronger demand for high-quality
information and that local accounting standards were already designed to cover this demand.
IFRS adoption decreases (increases) the explanatory power of earnings and equity book
value for stock prices in the group of full (partial) adopters, although differences are not
statistically significant. With regard to the ability of earnings to explain future cash flows, it
5 As an example, accounting serves taxation purposes in a number of European countries (e.g., Germany and
France), and with this aim domestic accounting standards are heavily aligned with taxation rules. Such an
alignment is not observed for IFRS. As a consequence, IFRS are not able to fulfill the same role in computing
income taxes as that played by domestic standards. For further discussion, see Nobes (1998).
6 The explanatory power of accounting figures for stock prices is widely used by researchers as an indicator of
accounting quality (e.g., Barth et al., 2008; Bartov, Goldberg, & Kim, 2005; Lang, Raedy, & Wilson, 2006). We
complement it with the ability of accounting measures to explain one-year-ahead operating cash flows. Even
though stock prices are expected to reflect the stream of future cash flows, this is a more direct test of the ability of
accounting measures to predict cash flows (Al-Attar & Hussain, 2004; Barth, Cram, & Nelson, 2001).
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significantly increases in both groups of countries.7 Furthermore, we observe that changes
in accounting quality are larger in the group of partial adopters. Taken together, results for
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ptock prices and future cash flows provide weak evidence of an increase in accounting
uality after IFRS adoption. However, what is clearly shown is that the effect of IFRS
mplementation on accounting quality is different for firms in the group of full and partial
dopters. Hence, results suggest that full and partial adopter countries differ in the primary
im of their domestic standards.
Finally, we observe that, despite the changes motivated by IFRS adoption, accounting
uality is still significantly lower in countries prohibiting the use of IFRS in legal entity
inancial statements. We interpret these results as further evidence that the demand for high-
uality financial reporting is lower in this group of countries.
Overall, this study provides evidence consistent with the hypothesis that firms in
ountries that retained the use of local standards in legal entity financial statements face a
ower demand for high-quality financial reporting. Results suggest that, rather than the
nformation requirements of capital providers, local standards in these countries satisfy
ther needs (e.g., regulatory needs, such as the computation of income taxes). Since IFRS
re primarily aimed at fulfilling the information demands of investors and creditors,
ountries wishing to maintain the regulatory role played by accounting opted for requiring
he application of their local standards in the preparation of legal entity financial statements.
Additionally, this study contributes to prior research by providing evidence of the
ifferences in accounting quality between European countries that still existed in 2004, in spite
f the harmonization efforts carried out inside the European Union over the last decades.
oreover, we show that implementation of IFRS reduces these differences, but it does not
ompletely remove them. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003), we
ind that adoption of IFRS by itself is not sufficient to achieve a high level of accounting quality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops
he hypotheses. Section 3 lays out our research design. Section 4 reports the results of our
nalyses. Finally, the discussion of the results and conclusions are offered in Section 5.
. Background and research questions.1. Accounting quality in Europe prior to IFRS adoption
Adoption of IFRS in Europe was motivated by the objective of creating a strong internal
apital market given the inability of prior regulation (European Directives) to further foster
he necessary accounting harmonization. The Fourth Directive, issued in 1978, and the
eventh Directive, issued in 1983, propelled significant changes in company (and
ccounting) legislation in EU Member States (Thorell & Whittington, 1994). However,
egulation 1606/2002 recognized that Council Directives could not ensure the high levels
f transparency and comparability necessary to build an efficient integrated capital market.
7 It could be argued that the change in accounting quality is motivated, not only by the introduction of IFRS, but
lso by the efforts to strengthen the enforcement regime taken in the EU at the same time as IFRS adoption.
owever, as explained previously, we compare local standards and IFRS accounting measures for the same
eriod (2004), and this assures us that everything, except for accounting rules, is constant.
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European Directives established minimum reporting requirements and allowable options,
but the standard setting process was left to Member States, who were required to enact
provisions complying with Directives into national law. As a result, domestic standards
varied considerably depending on country-specific characteristics. The study by Bae, Tan,
and Welker (2008) provides a clear picture of the differences in accounting standards across
European countries. Based on the survey GAAP 2001: A Survey of National Accounting
Rules Benchmarked against International Accounting Standards (Nobes, 2001), Bae et al.
(2008) identify differences between domestic standards and IFRS on 21 accounting rules
for a sample of 49 countries. Regarding European countries, the number of accounting rules
that they find to vary with respect to IFRS ranges from just one, in the case of the United
Kingdom and Ireland, to 18 for Luxemburg.8
Given the orientation of IFRS toward the needs of capital providers, the differences
depicted by Bae et al. (2008) suggest that accounting is not primarily aimed at satisfying
capital providers' needs across all European countries. Prior research has highlighted the
regulatory role played by accounting in Continental European countries, where accounting
standards are set by government bodies and are designed to satisfy regulatory needs (Choi
& Mueller, 1992). Furthermore, Ding, Hope, Jeanjean, and Stolowy (2007) document a
significant association between countries' domestic accounting standards dissimilarities
with respect to IFRS and the importance of their equity markets. Differences are larger in
countries with less-developed capital markets, which suggests that the demand for high-
quality financial reporting is lower in these countries, since banks tend to supply most of the
capital needs of business and usually have direct access to company information (Joos &
Lang, 1994). On the contrary, firms in countries with more-developed capital markets get
most of their financing from small shareholders, who rely on public information for their
decisions, thus propelling a stronger demand for high-quality financial reporting.
We argue that countries' decisions about whether or not to retain local standards for legal
entity financial statements reflect differences in the main role played by accounting. We
hypothesize that countries that already have accounting systems oriented toward the
satisfaction of the information demands of capital providers permit the use of IFRS in all
company statements, since IFRS and their local standards fulfill similar roles. On the
contrary, countries requiring the use of local standards in legal entity financial statements
are likely to be those where legal entity financial statements prepared in accordance with
local standards play a significant regulatory role (e.g., in computing income taxes). Since
IFRS financial statements cannot play such a role, countries retain their domestic standards
for legal entity financial statements. In this way, they also keep control over these standards,
usually set by government bodies.
On the basis of prior arguments and evidence, we expect a higher level of accounting
quality for firms in the group of full adopter countries than in partial adopters. Hence, we
state our first hypothesis as follows:
H1. Prior to IFRS adoption, firms in full adopters have higher accounting quality than
firms in partial adopters.
8 Further evidence of differences in accounting standards across countries is provided by Ashbaugh and Pincus
(2001), Hung (2001), and Ding, Jeanjean, and Stolowy (2005).
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2.2. Change in accounting quality resulting from the mandatory shift to IFRS
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aRegulators expect an improvement in the level of transparency and the quality of
inancial reporting after mandatory IFRS adoption (Regulation EC 1606/2002). However,
s Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi (2008) explain, there are arguments suggesting an
mprovement in accounting quality because of the high quality of IFRS, but there are also
easons to think that mandatory adoption of IFRS alone is not sufficient to increase the
uality of financial reporting.
IFRS are extensively viewed as a set of high-quality accounting standards. The
ecommendation of the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO,
000) that IOSCO members permit foreign companies to use IFRS in preparing financial
tatements for cross-border offerings and listings is an example of the perceived quality of
FRS. Accordingly, except in those countries with local standards of similar quality to IFRS
e.g., the United Kingdom or Ireland), an improvement in accounting quality can be
xpected after IFRS adoption. Extant research provides evidence supporting this widely
eld expectation. As an example, a recent study by Barth et al. (2008) analyzing domestic
tandards and IFRS across 21 countries, shows that, as compared to firms applying
omestic standards, those using IFRS exhibit less earnings management, more timely loss
ecognition, and more value relevant accounting measures.9 Likewise, Ashbaugh and
incus (2001) report a reduction in analysts' forecast errors when IFRS are applied,
oncluding that this derives from IFRS providing more predictable measures. Along the
ame line, Daske and Gebhardt (2006) show an increase in disclosure quality under IFRS in
ustria, Germany, and Switzerland prior to mandatory adoption in 2005.
When interpreting the results of the above-mentioned studies, however, we must be
ware that they refer to voluntary adoption of IFRS, which may result from corporate
ncentives to increase transparency. Ashbaugh (2001) documents that the decision to report
nder IFRS is positively related to corporate size, the number of foreign equity markets
here the firm's shares are traded, and the additional issuance of equity shares. Similar
indings are reported by Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) and Cuijpers and Buijink (2005).
esults of these studies suggest that companies voluntarily shifting to IFRS have incentives
o improve transparency and the quality of financial reporting (Leuz & Verrechia, 2000).
oreover, Covrig, Defond, and Hung (2007) show that foreign mutual fund ownership is
ignificantly higher among IFRS adopters. They conclude that a firm's voluntary switch to
FRS is aimed at attracting foreign investors by providing them with both more information
nd information that is more familiar to them. Since the same incentives are not likely to be
ound when IFRS adoption is mandatory, results referring to voluntary shifts may not
xtrapolate to mandatory adoption cases. Christensen, Lee, and Walker (2008) provide
vidence consistent with this view. They investigate voluntary and mandatory shifts to
FRS in Germany, where firms were allowed to switch to IFRS prior to 2005. They find
hat, while voluntary adoption is associated with an increase in accounting quality, such
9 Similar results are reported by Bartov et al. (2005) and Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) for a single country,
ermany. Bartov et al. (2005) show that IFRS earnings are more value relevant, and Gassen and Sellhorn (2006)
eport that IFRS earnings are more persistent and more conditionally conservative. However, for the same
ountry, Hung and Subramanyam (2007) do not find evidence of a significant difference in the value relevance of
ccounting measures (earnings and equity book value) after adoption of IFRS.
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improvement is not observed in the case of mandatory shifts. They conclude that high-
quality accounting standards like IFRS do not necessarily lead to higher quality accounting,
at least when firms do not perceive net benefits from IFRS adoption. That is to say, adoption
of IFRS by itself does not necessarily improve financial reporting, and this brings us to the
arguments for the absence of an improvement after mandatory IFRS implementation.
The evidence provided by Christensen et al. (2008) is consistent with prior research
showing that accounting standards are not the only factor affecting the quality of accounting
systems (Pownall & Schipper, 1999). Under a given set of standards, financial reporting
quality is sensitive to the incentives of preparers, which depend on the interplay between
market and political forces, such as the demand for high-quality financial reporting, the
involvement of governments in the standard-setting process and the enforcement of
standards, and taxes or political incentives to reduce the volatility of reported earnings (Ball
et al., 2003). By examining accounting quality in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and
Thailand, Ball et al. (2003) demonstrate that accounting quality is ultimately determined by
the economic and political factors that influence managers' and auditors' incentives, rather
than by accounting standards per se. Despite the fact that these four countries have high-
quality accounting standards derived from common law sources, the authors find that
financial reporting quality is not higher than under code–law systems.
Further evidence referring specifically to IFRS adoption and stressing the importance of
the institutional environment for the quality of financial reporting is provided by Daske et
al. (2008). They investigate the capital market effects of mandatory IFRS adoption in 23
countries around the world and find an increase in market liquidity, a decrease in firms' cost
of capital, and an increase in equity valuations, but only in countries where firms have
incentives to be transparent and where legal enforcement is strong.10 Their evidence
underlines the importance of firms' reporting incentives and countries' enforcement
regimes for the quality of financial reporting.
Although European countries already had relatively strong legal systems, the EU revised
and strengthened its enforcement regime along with the adoption of IFRS (Hail & Leuz,
2007). As a consequence, an improvement in accounting quality could be expected after the
introduction of IFRS. Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer, and Riedl (2008) and Daske et al.
(2008) provide evidence consistent with this expectation. In an events study, Armstrong et
al. (2008) examine the European stock market reaction to the likelihood of IFRS adoption
in Europe and find a positive (negative) reaction to events that increased (decreased) the
likelihood of IFRS introduction. In the same vein, Daske et al. (2008) find that capital
market effects of IFRS adoption are stronger in EU countries than in the rest of the countries
that mandate the use of IFRS. Furthermore, they show that capital market effects of IFRS
10 Extant research points even to the possibility of a decrease in accounting quality after mandatory application
of IFRS. In an exploratory study of earnings management in Australia, France, and the United Kingdom, Jeanjean
and Stolowy (2008) observe that their metric of earnings management (i.e., the ratio of small reported profits to
small reported losses) does not significantly change after IFRS adoption in Australia and the United Kingdom, but
it increases in France. This can be explained by the high level of judgment involved in the application of IFRS as
compared to the rules-based French accounting system. Carmona and Trombetta (2008) argue that because of the
principles-based nature of IFRS, their application requires accountants and auditors to perform a number of
estimations, which sharply contrasts with the mechanical nature of the accounting process in the rules-based
systems existing prior to IFRS adoption in a number of European countries.
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adoption are larger for firms in countries with domestic standards that are of a lower quality
and that differ more from IFRS (Daske et al., 2008). Likewise, Armstrong et al. (2008)
observe that the positive market reaction to IFRS adoption is larger for firms with lower
levels of information quality prior to IFRS implementation and higher pre-adoption
information asymmetry. Based on prior evidence, we expect that the effect of IFRS
adoption on accounting quality varies between full and partial adopter countries. Therefore,
we state the following hypothesis to be tested in our study:
H2. Adoption of IFRS in Europe leads to an increase in accounting quality, with the effect
being larger for firms in the group of partial adopters than for firms in the group of full adopters.
2.3. Accounting quality after IFRS adoption
Besides the increase in accounting quality, endorsement of IFRS in Europe is expected
to reduce differences between countries, thereby allowing an increase in comparability of
accounting information (Pownall & Schipper, 1999). The level of reduction in differences,
however, is difficult to forecast. On the one hand, extant research documents a process of
spontaneous harmonization within European “global players.” Companies competing in
international markets had entered into a process of harmonization since the 1980s
(Cañibano & Mora, 2000; Thorell & Whittington, 1994) independently of the formal
political process. Likewise, Land and Lang (2003) document an increase in comparability
over time of accounting data of firms from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
On the other hand, research points out that full convergence in accounting will never be
achieved, due to a number of both firm-specific and country-specific factors (Jaafar &McLeay,
2007). Research reviewed in the prior section highlights that accounting quality depends, not
only on accounting standards, but also on firms' incentives to issue high-quality financial
statements. Adoption of IFRS in Europe eliminates differences in one of these elements:
accounting standards. In the preparation of their consolidated financial statements, European-
listed companies apply the same set of accounting standards. However, the same degree of
uniformity does not exist regarding countries' institutional frameworks and, as a consequence,
regarding firms' incentives to issue high-quality financial reporting. Extant research provides
evidence on the differences between European countries in their level of protection of
shareholders' rights, liability standards, the strength of the system of legal enforcement, the level
of ownership concentration, the degree of financial and tax alignment, or the importance of the
equitymarket (e.g., Hung, 2001; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2006, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). Moreover, research documents the key role played by
these institutional characteristics in shaping accounting quality (e.g., Ali & Hwang, 2000; Ball,
Kothari, & Robin, 2000; Burgstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 2006; Bushman & Piotroski, 2006).
The importance of firms' incentives for financial reporting quality is documented by
Ball and Shivakumar (2005). They compare public and private companies in the United
Kingdom and show that, despite the fact that all of them share the same accounting rules,
the timely recognition of economic losses is less prevalent in private than in public firms,
suggesting that the demand for accounting quality is higher for public companies. In the
same way, we do not expect IFRS adoption to completely remove differences in accounting
9
quality between European countries. As in the pre-adoption period, we expect firms in the
full-adopters group of countries to exhibit a higher level of accounting quality, because of
the stronger incentives that companies in these countries have to issue high-quality financial
reporting. Thus, we state our third hypothesis in the following way:
H3. After IFRS implementation, accounting quality is still significantly higher for firms in
full-adopter countries than in partial-adopter countries.
3. Sample and data
To form our sample, we select those European companies that started to apply IFRS in
2005, following Regulation 1606/2002.We focus our analysis on the 15 countries comprising
the EU when the decision to adopt IFRS was made (2002).11 To these countries we add
Norway, a non-EU country that is member of the European Economic Area and that, as such,
also had to adopt IFRS at the same time as the EU.12 Companies incorporated in these countries
were required by IFRS-1 to restate their prior-year financial statements to IFRSwhenpreparing
their first IFRS financial statements (i.e., 2005 financial statements).Accordingly, there are two
sets of financial statements for these companies for the 2004 accounting year: (1) those
prepared in accordance with their local standards and published in the 2004 annual report and
(2) those restated and presented joined to the 2005 financial statements.
To obtain our sample, we used the Standard & Poor's Global Vantage database and
selected those companies applying domestic standards (DS) in 2004 and international
standards (IFRS) in 2005. Accounting measures for 2004 in the Global Vantage database are
those originally reported by companies and conforming to local standards. However, the
OSIRIS database reports the restated figures to IFRS for 2004. We exploit this advantage and
use both databases jointly; we take 2004 accountingmeasures resulting from the application of
local standards fromGlobal Vantage and the 2004 restated figures to IFRS fromOSIRIS. The
rest of the data needed in our analyses comes from the Global Vantage database.
In the screening process, we delete all companieswithmissing values on the variables used in
our analyses (i.e., net income before extraordinary items and book value of equity for 2004, as
reported in 2004 annual reports and restated to IFRS; operating cash flow for 2005; and market
value of equity for 2004). To minimize the effect of outliers, we also delete the top and bottom
1% of the distribution of the variables used in our analyses, as well as observations whose
studentized residuals are four or greater in our regression models. The final sample is comprised
of 1039 observations from 15 countries13 (companies from Ireland did not satisfy the screening
criteria). Table 1 presents the distribution of companies by country.
11 These countries are: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, the United Kingdom,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. We select them for our analysis because
these were the countries that took the decision of adopting IFRS for consolidated financial statements of listed
companies in Europe. Countries entering the EU afterward did not take part on that decision.
12 Iceland and Liechtenstein are also members of the European Economic Area, but we excluded them from our analysis
because of the low number of companies (5 and 1, respectively, in the Global Vantage database before the screening
process).
13 The sample includes firms cross-listed in the United States. Since these firms are subject to additional
disclosure requirements and SEC enforcement, they could introduce a bias in our study. We thank the referee for
raising this point. As a robustness check, we repeat all our analyses after excluding firms that cross-list in the
United States, and results remain qualitatively unchanged.
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Table 1 shows that the number of companies is unevenly distributed across countries.
Whereas French companies represent 21% of observations, Greek firms represent 5%, and
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iuxemburg represents just 0.3% of sample firms. This uneven distribution can be partially
ttributed to the size of the country and the number of companies incorporated. However,
ifferences arise also because of the “early” adoption of IFRS permitted in several countries
e.g., Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, or Germany). As an example, a large number of
erman companies were applying IFRS before 2005. Due to the characteristics of our
esearch design, these companies are not included in our sample. This explains the
elatively low number of companies from Germany as well as Austria, Belgium, or
enmark in our sample.14 Finally, our sample includes also a relatively low number of UK-
ased firms. This is due to the fact that a large number of firms in the United Kingdom,
articularly those quoted in the AIM, continue to use local standards.
Table 1 also lists the countries in which the use of IFRS in legal entity financial statements
s (and is not) permitted.15 As can be seen, half of the countries in our sample impose some
estriction on the use of IFRS and do not allow them in all company statements.
. Results.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analyses. Panel A
resents the descriptive statistics for the subsample of full adopters, while Panel B reports
tatistics for partial adopters. Panel C shows mean differences between IFRS and local
tandards accounting measures.
Descriptive statistics show that restatements increase the value of earnings in both
ubsamples, that is, local standards earnings (NIBE) are lower than earnings restated to
FRS (NIBE R), though differences are larger for firms in the group of partial adopters (i.e.,
.014 versus 0.020). Regarding the book value of equity, it slightly decreases (increases) in
he group of full (partial) adopters, that is, local standards equity (EQUITY) is higher
lower) than equity restated to IFRS (EQUITY R) for full (partial) adopters, with larger
ifferences for firms in partial-adopter countries (i.e., 0.007 versus 0.044). Overall,
escriptive statistics suggest the effect of IFRS adoption is different (larger) in partial
dopters than in full adopters. Data in Table 2 suggest that IFRS implementation did not
ring about a significant accounting change in full-adopter countries.
Table 3 presents the Spearman correlation coefficients for the variables in our study.
anel A presents the correlation matrix for the subsample of firms in full-adopter countries,
hile Panel B reports correlation coefficients for firms in partial adopters. Correlation
oefficients indicate that local standards and IFRS accounting measures are highly
orrelated in both subsamples. Coefficients are especially large for the book value of equity
14 Exclusion of early adopters (i.e., firms that were allowed to shift to IFRS prior to 2005) from our sample can
otentially introduce a bias in our findings. We thank the editor for raising this point. However, the sensitivity
nalysis performed (described in detail in Section 4.3) indicates that self-selection is not biasing our results.
15 Data is taken from the European Commission webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/accounting/docs/
as-use-of-options en.pdf.
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(ρ=0.937 for full adopters and ρ=0.950 for partial adopters), which suggests that this
measure does not significantly change with the adoption of IFRS. Table 3 also shows that
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum Percentile
25 50 75
Panel A: Full adopters
MKVLt 1.212 0.396 0.501 2.800 0.963 1.150 1.411
CFOt+1 0.127 0.177 −0.825 1.249 0.048 0.107 0.196
NIBEt 0.056 0.126 −0.667 0.733 0.023 0.066 0.108
EQUITYt 0.783 0.527 0.080 2.823 0.391 0.637 1.061
NIBE Rt 0.070 0.128 −0.674 0.677 0.031 0.074 0.118
EQUITY Rt 0.776 0.533 0.081 3.915 0.394 0.624 1.043
Panel B: Partial adopters
MKVLt 1.239 0.378 0.496 3.344 0.984 1.177 1.415
CFOt+1 0.132 0.216 −1.163 1.887 0.038 0.104 0.192
NIBEt 0.036 0.137 −0.597 1.052 0.007 0.055 0.088
EQUITYt 0.821 0.615 0.076 4.262 0.439 0.662 1.003
NIBE Rt 0.056 0.145 −0.649 1.052 0.010 0.066 0.099
EQUITY Rt 0.865 0.650 0.042 4.948 0.463 0.683 1.082
Panel C: Mean differences between IFRS and local standards accounting measures
NIBE R-NIBE (%) EQUITY R-EQUITY (%)
Full adopters 0.014 25 −0.007 −0.89
Partial adopters 0.020 56 0.044 5
The sample consists of 366 observations in Panel A and 673 in Panel B.MKLVt ismarket value of equity at closing date;
CFOt+1 is 2005 net cash flow from operating activities; NIBEt is 2004 net income before extraordinary items; EQUITYt
is 2004 book value of equity; NIBE Rt is 2004 net income before extraordinary items restated to IFRS; and EQUITY Rt
is 2004 book value of equity restated to IFRS. All variables are deflated by beginning-of-period market capitalization.earnings and book value of equity are significantly correlated with the market value of
equity and one-year-ahead operating cash flows, both prior to and after restatement to IFRS,
with correlation coefficients generally larger for firms in the group of full adopters.
4.2. Regression analyses
4.2.1. Differences in accounting quality prior to 2005
We start our analyses by comparing the value relevance of accounting measures
obtained in full-adopter and partial-adopter countries prior to the implementation of IFRS.
By value relevance, we refer to the explanatory power of accounting measures (i.e.,
earnings and book value of equity) for stock prices. Following prior research (e.g., Barth et
al., 2008; Hung & Subramanyam, 2007), we estimate the following model:
MKVLi = α + βNIBEi + γEQUITYi + εi ð1Þ
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where MKVL is year-end market value of equity,16 NIBE is net income before
extraordinary items,17 and EQUITY is year-end book value of equity. Accounting
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Table 3
Correlation matrix.
MKVLt CFOt+1 NIBEt EQUITYt NIBE Rt
Panel A: Full adopters
CFOt+1 −0.029
(0.579)
NIBEt 0.431 0.319
(0.000) (0.000)
EQUITYt 0.293 0.307 0.326
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NIBE Rt 0.425 0.354 0.833 0.355
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EQUITY Rt 0.275 0.327 0.341 0.937 0.424
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel B: Partial adopters
CFOt+1 0.006
(0.876)
NIBEt 0.450 0.304
(0.000) (0.000)
EQUITYt 0.250 0.227 0.316
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NIBE Rt 0.422 0.313 0.838 0.222
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EQUITY Rt 0.251 0.259 0.303 0.950 0.256
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table reports Spearman correlation coefficients. The sample consists of 366 observations in Panel A and 673 in
Panel B. MKLVt is market value of equity at closing date; CFOt+1 is 2005 net cash flow from operating activities;
NIBEt is 2004 net income before extraordinary items; EQUITYt is 2004 book value of equity; NIBE Rt is 2004 net
income before extraordinary items restated to IFRS; and EQUITY Rt is 2004 book value of equity restated to
IFRS. All variables are deflated by beginning-of-period market capitalization.easures are those obtained from the application of local standards. All variables refer to
he 2004 accounting year, and all of them, the intercept included, are deflated by beginning-
f-period market value of equity.18 The results of these estimations are presented in
able 4, Panel A, under the heading of “Model 1.”
Results show that both earnings and book value of equity are significant variables in
xplaining stock prices in both groups of countries. However, the value for the R-squared
uggests that accounting measures derived from the application of local standards have
ore explanatory power for stock prices in the group of full adopters. To formally test
16 Stock prices are used in these estimations as a proxy for the expectations of market participants about future
ash flows. The objective is to test which accounting regime provides measures that are more relevant to investors
n valuing the firm (Barth, Beaver, & Landsman, 2001).This is why we used year-end stock prices.
17 Since reporting of extraordinary items is not aligned to IFRS in all countries, we repeat all our analyses using
et income instead of income before extraordinary items. Results remain qualitatively unchanged.
18 Checks of robustness of results using other deflators are discussed in the sensitivity analysis section.
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whether this is the case, we use the Cramer Z-statistic19 (Cramer, 1987). The positive and
significant value for this statistic confirms the superiority of accounting measures in the
group of full adopters. Therefore, results support Hypothesis H1.
We also estimate the same model for the full sample after adding a dummy (PA)
indicating whether the country is or is not a partial adopter and the interaction of this
dummy with earnings and equity. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
MKVLi = α + β1NIBEi + β2EQUITYi + β3PAi + β4NIBEi ∗ PAi
+ β5EQUITYi ∗ PAi + εi
ð2Þ
where PA is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the country where the firm is
domiciled is a partial adopter; it takes the value of 0, otherwise.
Results of this estimation are presented in Table 4, Panel A, under the heading of “Model
2.” When interpreting these results, we must take into account that Model 2 allows
coefficients on NIBE and EQUITY to vary depending on whether or not the firm is
domiciled in a partial-adopter country. For partial adopters, the coefficient on NIBE is
given by (β1+β4) and the coefficient on EQUITY is given by (β2+β5), while for full
adopters, the coefficients are β1 and β2, respectively. Table 4 shows that the coefficient of
the interaction term NIBE⁎PA is not significantly different from 0, which means that the
coefficient on earnings for firms in partial adopters is not significantly different from that
for firms in full adopters.20 However, significant differences are observed for the book
value of equity. The interaction term EQUITY⁎PA is negative and statistically significant,
indicating that the coefficient on EQUITY is significantly lower for firms in the group of
partial adopters. Tests on coefficient restrictions, reported also in Table 4 (Panel A),
confirm that, whereas the coefficient on earnings is not statistically different between full
and partial adopters, the coefficient on equity is significantly larger in the group of full
adopters. Results are consistent with those reported previously and indicate that the role
played by equity in explaining stock prices is significantly different in both groups of
countries.
In addition to the value relevance of accounting measures, we are interested in
comparing the ability of earnings obtained from the application of local standards in full
versus partial adopters to predict one-year-ahead operating cash flows. To test whether
IFRS accounting numbers have higher ability to explain future cash flows than local
standards accounting figures, we estimate the following model:
CFOi = α + βNIBEi + εi ð3Þ19 Prior research uses the Cramer Z-statistic to test for differences in R-squared measures obtained from different
samples (e.g., Harris, Lang, & Möller, 1994; Lang et al., 2006; Van de Meulen, Gaeremynck, & Willekens,
2007).
20 Insignificance of differences between partial and full adopters may be explained by the small role played by
earnings in explaining stock prices. In unreported analyses, we drop earnings from Eq. (1) and find that the value
for the R-squared is 71.3% for full adopters and 63.2% for partial adopters, which means that equity on its own
explains almost as much as earnings and equity jointly.
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where CFO is one-year-ahead (2005) net cash flow from operating activities and NIBE is
net income before extraordinary items for 2004 accounting year. The two variables are
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teflated by average assets.21
Results of the estimation of Eq. (3) are presented in Table 4, Panel B, under the heading
f “Model 3.” As expected, the coefficient on earnings is positive and highly statistically
ignificant in both groups of countries, thereby indicating that future cash flows are
ositively related to current earnings. The explanatory power of the model, as measured by
he R-squared, is higher for firms in full adopters than for firms in partial adopters. These
esults suggest that, prior to IFRS endorsement, the ability of earnings to explain future cash
lows was higher in full-adopter countries. This is confirmed by the positive and highly
tatistically significant value of the Cramer Z-statistic. Hence, results are consistent with
hose presented previously referring to the explanatory power of accounting measures for
tock prices and provide additional support for our Hypothesis H1.
In the same way as in the value relevance model, we estimate Eq. (3) for the full sample
fter adding the dummy PA and the interaction term. Specifically, we estimate the
ollowing equation:
CFOi = α + β1NIBEi + β2PAi + β3NIBEi ∗PAi + εi ð4Þ
Results, presented in Table 4, Panel B, under the heading of “Model 4,” show that the
nteraction term is negative and statistically significant. Thus, the coefficient on earnings is
ignificantly lower for firms in partial adopters than for firms in full adopters, which is
onfirmed by the test on coefficient restrictions. Results are consistent with those reported
reviously and, again, indicate that the role played by accounting numbers in explaining
uture cash flows is significantly different in full-adopter and partial-adopter countries.
Overall, results show significant differences in accounting quality prior to IFRS
doption between countries permitting and prohibiting the use of IFRS in legal entity
inancial statements after 2005. More precisely, prior to IFRS implementation,
ccounting measures had more explanatory power for stock prices and future cash
lows in those countries that afterward permitted the use of IFRS throughout all company
tatements. Consistent with our first hypothesis, results suggest that, in full-adopter
ountries, accounting systems were already oriented toward the provision of high-quality
inancial reporting. Such an orientation is not likely to exist in partial-adoption countries,
here the observed lower level of accounting quality is suggestive of accounting playing
ther roles, rather than focusing exclusively on satisfying investors' demands for
nformation.
.2.2. Changes in accounting quality resulting from mandatory shift to IFRS
In this section, we test whether accounting quality changed after IFRS adoption and
hether the change was different in partial adopters and full adopters. With this aim, we re-
stimate Eqs. (1) and (3) using the accounting measures restated to IFRS. The results of
hese re-estimations are presented in Table 5. In order to facilitate the appreciation of the
21 In the sensitivity analyses section, we discuss the results obtained using other deflators.
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Table 4
Comparisons between full adopters and partial adopters prior to IFRS adoption.
Panel A: Value relevance of earnings and book value of equity
Model 1: MKVLi α+βNIBEi+γEQUITYi+εi
Model 2: MKVLi α+β1NIBEi+β2EQUITYi+β3PAi+β4NIBEi⁎PAi+β5EQUITYi⁎PAi+εi
Model 1 Model 2
Full adopters Partial adopters Full sample
Intercept 3.119 0.403 1.402
(3.91) ⁎⁎ (0.32) (3.15) ⁎⁎
NIBE 1.377 0.699 1.259
(3.60) ⁎⁎ (2.37) ⁎ (3.55) ⁎⁎
EQUITY 1.001 0.959 1.035
(17.08) ⁎⁎ (16.72) ⁎⁎ (18.80) ⁎⁎
PA 1.163
(46.82) ⁎⁎
NIBE⁎PA −0.357
(−0.96)
EQUITY⁎PA −1.027
(−17.31) ⁎⁎
R-squared 73.02% 63.72% 85.70%
Observations 366 673 1039
Cramer Z-statistic 8.147
p-value 0.000
Tests of coefficient restrictions (Model 2) F-statistic p-value
β1 β1+β4 0.92 0.337
β2 β2+β5 299 0.000
Panel B: Explanatory power of earnings for future cash flows
Model 3: CFOi α+βNIBEi+εi
Model 4: CFOi α+β1NIBEi+β2PAi+β3NIBEi⁎PAi+εi
Model 3 Model 4
Full adopters Partial adopters Full sample
Intercept 0.428 1.077 0.306
(1.34) (6.29) ⁎⁎ (1.78)
NIBE 0.835 0.711 0.840
(12.28) ⁎⁎ (12.75) ⁎⁎ (12.32) ⁎⁎
PA 0.052
(14.74) ⁎⁎
NIBE⁎PA −0.318
(−3.67) ⁎⁎
R-squared 42.62% 34.03% 48.91%
Observations 366 673 1039
Cramer Z-statistic 12.748
p-value 0.000
Tests of coefficient restrictions (Model 4) F-statistic p-value
β1 β1+β3 13.45 0.000
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differences motivated by IFRS adoption, Table 5 also reports the results of the estimation of
Models 1 and 3, using accounting measures derived from local standards as reported in
Table 5
Comparisons between local standards and IFRS.
Panel A: Value relevance of earnings and book value of equity
MKVLi α+βNIBEi+γEQUITYi+εi
Full adopters Partial adopters
LS IFRS LS IFRS
Intercept 3.119 2.857 0.403 0.512
(3.91) ⁎⁎ (3.36) ⁎⁎ (0.32) (0.47)
NIBE 1.377 1.023 0.699 1.302
(3.60) ⁎⁎ (2.72) ⁎⁎ (2.37) ⁎ (4.73) ⁎⁎
EQUITY 1.001 0.993 0.959 0.862
(17.08) ⁎⁎ (14.37) ⁎⁎ (16.72) ⁎⁎ (16.52) ⁎⁎
R-squared 73.02 70.84 63.72 65.20
Observations 366 366 673 673
Vuong Z-statistic 1.28 −1.59
p-value 0.203 0.111
Panel B: Explanatory power of earnings for future cash flows
CFOi α+βNIBEi+εi
Intercept 0.428 0.373 1.077 0.907
(1.34) (1.44) (6.29) ⁎⁎ (5.38) ⁎⁎
NIBE 0.835 0.863 0.711 0.774
(12.28) ⁎⁎ (15.04) ⁎⁎ (12.75) ⁎⁎ (14.81) ⁎⁎
R-squared 42.62 46.43 34.03 41.37
Observations 366 366 673 673
Vuong Z-statistic −5.32 −6.99
p-value 0.000 0.000
MKLV is market value of equity at closing date; NIBE is net income before extraordinary items; EQUITY is book
value of equity; and CFO is one-year-ahead net cash flow from operating activities. Variables under the headings of
LS and IFRS are as originally reported and restated to IFRS, respectively. All variables are deflated by beginning-
of-period market capitalization in Panel A and by average assets in Panel B. Models are estimated with White's
correction for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. The Vuong Z-statistic is used to compare
the explanatory power of models for LS versus IFRS.
⁎⁎ Indicate statistical significance at 1%.
⁎ Indicate statistical significance at 5%.Table 4.
Notes to Table 4:
MKLV is market value of equity at closing date; NIBE is net income before extraordinary items as originally
reported (local standards); EQUITY is book value of equity as originally reported (local standards); CFO is one-
year-ahead net cash flow from operating activities. All variables are deflated by beginning-of-period market
capitalization in Panel A and by average assets in Panel B. Models are estimated with White's correction for
heteroskedasticity. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Cramer's Z-statistic compares the explanatory power of
models in the group of full adopters versus partial adopters.
⁎⁎Indicate statistical significance at 1%.
⁎Indicate statistical significance at 5%.
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Panel A in Table 5 presents the results referring to the explanatory power of accounting
measures for stock prices. In the same way as when examining local standards accounting
figures, results indicate that earnings and book value of equity under IFRS are significant
variables in explaining stock prices. When comparing IFRS and local standards, the value
for the R-squared suggests that the explanatory power of accounting measures for stock
prices did not change significantly after IFRS adoption. Only a slight decrease (increase) is
observed in the subsample of full (partial) adopters. To formally test whether differences are
statistically significant, we use the Vuong Z-statistic (Vuong, 1989). This is a directional
test, designed to evaluate competing non-nested models, that indicates which model is
closer to explaining the data.22 The Vuong Z-statistic takes a negative value for the
subsample of partial adopters and a positive value for full adopters, thereby suggesting that
local standards dominate IFRS in the group of full adopters and IFRS dominate local
standards in the group of partial adopters. However, differences are not statistically
significant in either case. Descriptive statistics (see Table 2) show little variation in equity
after restatement to IFRS. This, in addition to the fact that equity on its own explains most
of the variability in stock prices (see footnote 20), can account for the reason why no
significant changes in value relevance are observed after IFRS restatement.
We also re-estimate Eq. (3) to investigate whether the explanatory power of accounting
measures for future cash flows significantly changes after IFRS adoption. Results are
presented in Table 5, Panel B. As expected, the coefficient on earnings is positive and highly
statistically significant in both groups of countries. Regarding the comparison of IFRS and
local standards, the value for the R-squared indicates that earnings obtained under IFRS have
more explanatory power for future cash flows. The value for the Vuong Z-statistic, negative
and highly statistically significant in the two groups, confirms that IFRS earnings measures
dominate earnings figures obtained from local standards. Furthermore, results show that the
change in accounting quality is larger in the group of partial adopters. The R-squared
increases 21.6% in this group, as compared to an increase of 8.9% in the group of full
adopters.
Taken together, the results of the value relevance analysis and the prediction of future
cash flows provide modest support for Hypothesis H2. The ability of earnings to explain
future cash flow increases significantly after the restatement to IFRS, and the magnitude of
the increase is, as expected, larger in the group of partial adopters. However, no significant
differences are observed in the explanatory power of accounting measures for stock prices,
though the fact that it increases (decreases) in the group of partial (full) adopters suggests
that the impact of IFRS in accounting quality is not uniform across these two groups of
countries.
4.2.3. Accounting quality after IFRS adoption
The last step in our analyses is the comparison of accounting quality between full and
partial adopters after IFRS implementation. This requires the comparison of models22 The Vuong Z-statistic is widely used by accounting researchers in discriminating between competing non-
nested models (e.g., Dechow, 1994; Barth, Cram, et al., 2001; Al-Attar & Hussain, 2004).
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presented under the headings of “Full adopters-IFRS” and “Partial adopters-IFRS” in
Table 5. For purposes of clarity, Table 6 reports again these models, under the headings
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af “Model 1” and “Model 3,” as well as the Cramer Z-statistic used to compare them.
Results show that, despite the fact that the set of accounting standards is the same, there
re still important differences in accounting quality between firms in full-adopter and
artial-adopter countries. The values for the R-squared indicate that the explanatory power
f accounting measures for stock prices and future cash flows is higher for firms in the
roup of full adopters than for companies in partial adopters. The Cramer Z-statistic
onfirms that firms in full-adopter countries exhibit a significantly higher level of
ccounting quality, thus supporting Hypothesis H3.
As we did when we examined accounting quality prior to IFRS adoption, we re-
stimate IFRS models for the full sample after adding the PA dummy and the
orresponding interaction terms. Results of these estimations are presented in Table 6
nder the headings of “Model 2” and “Model 4.” Results mirror those obtained for local
tandards measures. In Model 2, we find that the coefficient on earnings is not
ignificantly different for full and partial adopters (i.e., the interaction term is not
ignificantly different from zero), while the coefficient on equity is significantly lower
or partial adopters (i.e., the interaction term is negative and significant). These results
re confirmed by tests on coefficient restrictions also reported in Table 6. As for Model
, the negative and significant coefficient of the interaction term indicates that the
oefficient on earnings is significantly lower in the group of partial adopters, as also
hown by the test on coefficient restrictions. Results evidence the different role played
y accounting measures in explaining stock prices and future cash flows in the groups
f full and partial adopters.
Overall, results reported in Table 6 show that after IFRS implementation there are still
ignificant differences in accounting quality between firms in full-adopter and partial-
dopter countries. Accounting quality, as measured by the explanatory power of
ccounting measures for stock prices and future cash flows, is still significantly higher
or full-adopter countries than for partial-adopter countries after IFRS implementation.
hese findings are consistent with Hypothesis H3 and provide further support for the
rgument that accounting does not play the same role in countries permitting and
rohibiting the use of IFRS in legal entity financial statements. Differences in accounting
uality after IFRS adoption are indicative of a stronger demand for high-quality financial
eporting in those countries permitting the use of IFRS in legal entity financial
tatements.
Consistent with the findings reported by Ball et al. (2003), we provide additional
vidence showing that reporting quality is not only determined by accounting standards, but
lso by the institutional setting where these standards are applied. In our study, the same set
f accounting standards applied in different countries is found to result in significantly
ifferent levels of accounting quality. Nonetheless, comparison of accounting quality
efore and after IFRS adoption (Table 4 versus Table 6) suggest that differences between
oth groups of countries are substantially lowered (i.e., differences in R-squared drop from
.3 to 5.6 for the value relevance model and from 8.6 to 5.06 for the cash flow model).
herefore, results suggest that, as expected, the adoption of IFRS is reducing differences in
ccounting quality across European countries.
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Table 6
Comparisons of full adopters and partial adopters after IFRS adoption.
Panel A: Value relevance of earnings and book value of equity
Model 1: MKVLi α+βNIBE Ri+γEQUITY Ri+εi
Model 2: MKVLi α+β1NIBE Ri+β2EQUITY Ri+β3PAi+β4NIBE Ri⁎PAi+β5 EQUITY Ri⁎PAi+εi
Model 1 Model 2
Full adopters Partial adopters Full sample
Intercept 2.857 0.512 1.291
(3.36)⁎⁎ (0.47) (3.56)⁎⁎
NIBE R 1.023 1.302 0.909
(2.72)⁎⁎ (4.73)⁎⁎ (2.57)⁎⁎
EQUITY R 0.993 0.862 1.028
(14.37)⁎⁎ (16.52)⁎⁎ (15.99)⁎⁎
PA 1.138
(46.18)⁎⁎
NIBE R⁎PA 0.008
(0.02)
EQUITY R⁎PA −1.010
(−15.02)⁎⁎
R-squared 70.84% 65.20% 85.08%
Observations 366 673 1039
Cramer Z-statistic 5.073
p-value 0.000
Tests of coefficient restrictions (Model 2) F-statistic p-value
β1 β1+β4 0.00 0.982
β2 β2+β5 255 0.000
Panel B: Explanatory power of earnings for future cash flows
Model 3: CFOi α+βNIBE Ri+εi
Model 4: CFOi α+β1NIBE Ri+β2PAi+β3NIBE Ri⁎PAi+εi
Model 3 Model 4
Full adopters Partial adopters Full sample
Intercept 0.373 0.907 0.262
(1.44) (5.38)⁎⁎ (1.81)
NIBE R 0.863 0.774 0.867
(15.04)⁎⁎ (14.81)⁎⁎ (15.28)⁎⁎
PA 0.046
(13.43)⁎⁎
NIBE R⁎PA −0.304
(−3.95)⁎⁎
R-squared 46.43% 41.37% 51.85%
Observations 366 673 1039
Cramer Z-statistic 7.112
p-value 0.000
Tests of coefficient restrictions (Model 4) F-statistic p-value
β1 β1+β3 15.59 0.000
20
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Table 7
Differences between full adopters and partial adopters.
Variable Mean t-statistic p-value K-Wallis statistic p-value
Importance of equity market PA 9.350 −4.117 0.001 8.371 0.004
FA 18.157
Tax-book conformity PA 1.000 5.000 0.001 5.769 0.005
FA 0.167
Sources of GAAP PA 0.000 −3.041 0.010 3.429 0.064
FA 0.571
Public enforcement PA 0.400 −0.075 0.942 0.000 1.000
FA 0.407
Liability standard PA 0.324 −2.372 0.034 3.646 0.056
FA 0.584
Importance of equity market is measured as in Leuz et al. (2003) as the mean rank of three variables used in La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997): the ratio of the aggregate stock market capitalization held by
minorities to gross national product, the number of listed domestic firms relative to the population, and the number
of IPOs relative to population. Higher values in each variable indicate greater importance of the equity market. Tax-
book conformity is Hung's index of convergence between tax and financial reporting (Hung, 2001). The index
takes the value of 1 for countries with high tax-book conformity and the value of 0, otherwise. Sources of GAAP is
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for countries where the private sector is involved in the standard-setting
process and the value of 0, otherwise. Public enforcement is the index of public enforcement of securities laws
constructed by La Porta et al. (2006). Higher values for this index indicate stronger enforcement. Liability standard
is the index of liability standards from La Porta et al. (2006) and indicates to what extent liability standards
facilitate private enforcement. Higher values for the index indicate lower procedural difficulty in recovering losses
from the issuer and its directors, the distributor, or the accountant in a civil liability case for losses due to
misleading financial statements.In this paper, we hypothesize that countries requiring the use of local standards in legal
ntity financial statements do so because financial reporting in these countries ismore oriented
oward the fulfillment of needs, such as regulatory ones, rather than satisfying the information
emands of capital providers. Given the orientation of IFRS to the needs of investors and
reditors, partial-adopter countries are likely to retain their local standards in legal entity
inancial statements with the aim of maintaining the regulatory role fulfilled by accounting
nder local standards, since IFRS accounting cannot play this role. Our evidence is consistent
ith this hypothesis.We find a significantly higher level of accounting quality for firms in full-
dopter countries than for firms in partial adopters, both prior to and after IFRS adoption.
ence, our results are indicative of a stronger orientation of accounting toward the needs of
apital providers in the group of full adopters. The lower level of accounting quality observed
otes to Table 6:
KLV is market value of equity at closing date; NIBE R is net income before extraordinary items restated toFRS; EQUITY R is book value of equity restated to IFRS; and CFO is one-year-ahead net cash flow from
perating activities. All variables are deflated by beginning-of-period market capitalization in Panel A and by
verage assets in Panel B. Models are estimated with White's correction for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics are
hown in parentheses. The Cramer-Z statistic compares the explanatory power of models in the group of full
dopters versus partial adopters.
*Indicate statistical significance at 1%.
*Indicate statistical significance at 5%.
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for firms in partial adopters suggests that companies have lower incentives to issue high-
quality financial reporting in these countries, which is likely due to the fact that main capital
providers usually have direct access to company information.
In this section, we test whether country characteristics are also indicative of the
differences in the orientation of financial information. Specifically, we compare the
importance of the equity market, the level of tax-book conformity, the involvement of the
private sector in the standard-setting process, the strength of public enforcement, and the
degree of difficulty in exercising private enforcement in both groups of countries. These are
characteristics that prior research has found to be significantly related to accounting quality
(e.g., Hanlon, Maydew, & Shevlin, 2008; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). Table 7 reports
t-statistics and K-Wallis statistics used to compare full and partial adopters.
Results show the existence of significant differences between both groups of countries in
all the characteristics analyzed, except for public enforcement. Regarding the sources of
GAAP, results indicate that the private sector is usually involved in the standard-setting
process in full adopters, but not in partial adopters. When accounting rules are set by
government bodies (i.e., the private sector is not involved in the standard-setting process),
standards tend to be primarily aimed at satisfying regulatory needs, such as computing
income taxes, instead of addressing the needs of capital providers (Choi & Mueller, 1992).
Hence, partial adopters are likely to have accounting standards more oriented toward the
fulfillment of regulatory needs. The significantly higher degree of financial-tax alignment
exhibited by partial adopters also is indicative of the regulatory role (i.e., computation of
income taxes) played by accounting in these countries.
Significant differences also are observed regarding the importance of the equity market,
which is found to be significantly higher in full adopters than in partial adopters. Results suggest
that firms in full adopters depend more on the equity market for their financing than companies
in partial adopters. Accordingly, they are likely to face a stronger demand for high-quality
financial reporting. On the contrary, companies in partial adopters are likely to get most of their
financing from banks or large shareholders, who usually have a direct access to company
information. As a consequence, the demand for high-quality accounting is lower. Differences
observed for liability standards point to the same conclusion.When trying to recover losses due
to misleading financial reporting in a civil liability case, financial statements users face
significantly lower procedural difficulty in full-adopter than in partial-adopter countries. Hence,
firms are more likely to engage in high-quality financial reporting in full-adopter countries.
Overall, differences in country characteristics are indicative of an orientation of
accounting systems toward regulatory needs in those countries prohibiting the use of IFRS
in legal entity financial statements. This evidence is consistent with that provided in prior
sections and supports our hypothesis that partial adopters retain the use of local standards in
legal entity financial statements to ensure that accounting keeps fulfilling the regulatory
role it used to play in these countries.
4.4. Sensitivity analyses
4.4.1. Self selection bias
Companies applying IFRS or U.S. GAAP prior to mandatory IFRS adoption (early
adopters) did not enter into our sample because of our research design. As we wanted to
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compare accounting quality prior to and after IFRS adoption holding everything else
constant, we formed our sample with those companies that shifted from domestic standards
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mo IFRS in 2005 when application of IFRS became mandatory. Exclusion of early adopters
rom our sample can potentially introduce a bias in our findings, since early adopters are
ikely to be firms with the largest incentives to issue high-quality information. Hence, the
ower accounting quality observed for firms in the group of partial adopters reported
reviously could be due to the fact that once early adopters are excluded the remaining
irms were those with the lowest incentives to issue high-quality information.
In order to test whether self-selection bias affects our results, we re-estimate our models,
ncluding in our sample all companies applying IFRS in 2005, disregarding whether these
ompanies were early adopters.23 The sample size increases significantly, particularly in the
roup of partial adopters,24 but results are totally consistent with those obtained for our
riginal sample. Results are reported in Table 8, where it can be observed that the
xplanatory power of accounting measures for stock prices and future cash flows is
ignificantly higher for firms in the group of full adopters. Hence, we also document
ignificant differences in accounting quality between both groups of countries when early
dopters enter into the sample.
As a further robustness check, we re-estimate our models using 2005 IFRS accounting
ata, instead of the 2004 restated figures to IFRS. Results, untabulated, are totally
onsistent with those presented in Table 8.
.4.2. Use of other deflators
Since there is no agreement over the best deflator to be used in order to mitigate scaleffects when dealing with levels variables, we follow the recommendation of Barth and
linch (2005) and test the robustness of our results using different deflators. We start by re-
stimating Eq. (1), deflating all variables by average assets. Results, untabulated, are totally
onsistent with those presented in Tables 4–6.
In the same way, we re-estimate Eq. (3) after deflating all variables by net sales and
arket capitalization at the beginning of the period. The direction of the results,
ntabulated, is the same as that reported in Tables 4–6. Hence, we are confident that results
egarding the ability of earnings to explain stock prices and future cash flows are not
ensitive to the use of different deflators.
.4.3. Estimation with country fixed effects
Finally, we also checked the robustness of results of our value relevance models bystimating them with country fixed effects in order to control for differences in market risk
cross countries. Results, unreported, remain qualitatively unchanged.
23 Since early adopters did not provide financial information under local GAAPs for the 2004 accounting period,
ur analysis refers exclusively to comparisons of accounting numbers restated to IFRS.
24 In countries such as Germany, a large number of companies were applying IFRS or U.S. GAAP prior to
andatory IFRS adoption.
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5. Discussion and conclusions
Table 8
Comparisons of full adopters and partial adopters after IFRS adoption (sample includes early adopters).
Panel A: Value relevance of earnings and book value of equity
MKVLi α+βNIBE Ri+γEQUITY Ri+εi
Full adopters Partial adopters
Intercept 0.055 1.257
(0.10) (1.27)
NIBE R 0.714 1.023
(2.34) ⁎ (5.03) ⁎⁎
EQUITY R 1.070 0.866
(17.35) ⁎⁎ (19.83) ⁎⁎
R-squared 70.79% 65.89%
Observations 424 963
Cramer Z-statistic 4.106
p-value 0.000
Panel B: Explanatory power of earnings for future cash flows
CFOi α+βNIBE Ri+εi
Intercept 0.392 0.796
(1.54) (3.55) ⁎⁎
NIBE R 0.828 0.687
(16.70) ⁎⁎ (16.58) ⁎⁎
R-squared 46.83% 32.83%
Observations 424 963
Cramer Z-statistic 19.97
p-value 0.000
The sample is comprised of 424 (963) firms applying IFRS in 2005 in the group of full (partial) adopter countries.
The sample includes firms that voluntarily shift to IFRS prior to 2005. MKLV is market value of equity at 2004
closing date; NIBE R is 2004 net income before extraordinary items restated to IFRS; EQUITY R is 2004 book
value of equity restated to IFRS; and CFO is one-year-ahead (2005) net cash flow from operating activities. All
variables are deflated by beginning-of-period market capitalization in Panel A and by average assets in Panel B.
Models are estimated with White's correction for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. The
Cramer Z-statistic compares the explanatory power of models in the group of full adopters versus partial adopters.
⁎⁎ Indicate statistical significance at 1%.
⁎ Indicate statistical significance at 5%.This study investigates whether the decision made by a number of European countries to
retain the use of local standards for legal entity financial statements after IFRS adoption is
explained by the orientation of their accounting systems toward the satisfaction of
regulatory needs. Specifically, we compare accounting quality between those countries
permitting (full adopters) and prohibiting (partial adopters) the use of IFRS in legal entity
financial statements both prior to and after IFRS adoption. Accounting quality (i.e.,
explanatory power of accounting measures for stock prices and future cash flows) is used in
this study as an indicator of the orientation of accounting systems toward the needs of
capital providers. We find that accounting quality is significantly higher for firms in the
group of full adopters, both prior to and after IFRS adoption. We interpret these results as
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evidence that accounting systems are primarily oriented toward the needs of investors and
creditors in full-adopter countries but serve other purposes (e.g., computation of income
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Aaxes) in partial-adopter countries. Furthermore, since IFRS are designed toward the
nformation needs of capital providers, they may not fulfill regulatory requirements, which
till represent a major objective of financial reporting in partial-adopter countries. This can
xplain why partial adopters decided to retain their local standards for the preparation of
egal entity financial statements. By doing so, the information needs of capital providers of
isted companies are covered by IFRS consolidated financial statements, while legal entity
inancial statements, prepared in accordance with local standards, continue to fulfill the
egulatory needs.
Additionally, our study contributes to prior research by providing evidence on the
ifferences in accounting quality existing across European countries. Prior research
ocuments the differences in accounting quality across countries soon after the
mplementation of the European Directives (e.g., Alford, Jones, Leftwich, & Zmijewski,
993; Joos & Lang, 1994). Our study adds to this body of research by showing that
ignificant differences still persisted in 2004, despite the effort taken inside the EU to
armonize accounting. Furthermore, we show that adoption of IFRS reduced these
ifferences, but it did not completely remove them, since accounting quality in 2005 was
till significantly higher after IFRS implementation for firms in the group of full adopters.
hoices made by firms within IFRS are likely to be affected by firms' incentives to issue
igh-quality information. As a consequence, firms operating in financial environments
here they have lower incentives to produce high-quality financial reporting are likely to
hoose those alternatives that are more compatible with their local GAAP. Therefore, firms
n these countries do not achieve the same level of accounting quality as those operating in
he group of full adopters. These results add to prior evidence by showing that the set of
ccounting standards is not the only factor that shapes accounting quality (Ball et al., 2003).
n our study, the same set of accounting standards (IFRS) applied in relatively similar
ountries (EUMember States) leads to significant differences in accounting quality. Hence,
doption of IFRS by itself is not sufficient to achieve a high level of accounting quality in
ll countries. Regulation EC 1606/2002 already recognizes that a proper and rigorous
nforcement regime is essential to protect investors and improve confidence in capital
arkets. Acknowledging this, the EU is making important efforts to strengthen IFRS
nforcement (by monitoring compliance and taking appropriate measures in cases of
nfringements). Nonetheless, our results suggest that, even with stricter enforcement,
ccounting quality may vary across countries because of differences in firms' incentives to
ssue high-quality information, which are influenced, for example, by their dependence on
he equity market for their financing.
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